Recent studies have shown that trade costs may affect the pattern of international specialization. This paper shows that, when government procurement takes a specific pattern, trade costs becomes much less important in determining international specialization. One implications is that market integration and infrastructure building in Europe is very unlikely to reshape the European economic landscape. Welfare analysis shows that a specific scheme of expenditure on procurement may be welfare improving. The same scheme is effective in reducing income inequality across countries and, as such, can be used as substitute of transfer programs.
INTRODUCTION *
Regions appear to be more specialized within the United States than they are in Europe (see Krugman, 1991 for a prima-facie empirical evidence of this phenomenon). One powerful explanation for this is the presence of higher barriers to trade in Europe than in the United States (Krugman and Venables 1996) . High barriers to trade in Europe have prevented the agglomeration forces to take over in the past. But as the old continent moves towards a fully integrated single market, and trade costs are decreasing, the agglomeration phenomenon experienced by the US might occur in Europe as well. Yet, other important factors can explain the difference in regional specialization between US and Europe. This paper suggests that government spending had an important effect on the international/regional specialization. Trade costs and government spending are not mutually exclusive as possible explanations of the pattern of specialization, yet the policy prescription and the forecasts for the future with continued integration are very different when government spending is taken into account. This paper shows the relationship between trade costs and government spending; it appears that, under certain conditions, the influence of government spending on the pattern of specialization dominates the influence of trade costs.
There are several reasons to include governments into the picture. First, governments regard domestic relocation of economic activity as far less worrisome than an international relocation of economic activity. One might speculate that the American Government deemed unnecessary to try to influence the configuration of its domestic economic landscape. Conversely, the prospect * This paper has been written while the author was visiting fellow at Harvard University benefitting from of international relocation of industries in Europe (and the shift in power that it involves) may have worried more than one country in the old continent. A second reason to assess the impact of government spending on location decisions is quantitative: government procurement in the OECD countries is of the magnitude of about 10% of GDP (IMF, 1996) ; indeed a significant amount. Given the magnitude of this spending it is important to investigate whether its geographical allocation has an effect on the location decisions. Finally, there are two reasons which concern economic integration in Europe. First, the European Union is committed to prevent sharp regional specialization for fear that this will lead to large income disparities among countries. Despite the importance of the matter, up to date there has been no theoretical work studying the effect government procurement on international specialization. Lastly, the Single European Act, and many EEC's directives prior to that, binds the member states to removing their national bias in government procurement. The policy is aimed to the completion of the Single Market, but the implications for the pattern of specialization have been overlooked by policy makers and scholars alike. This paper explores the effectiveness of government procurement as an instrument that can be used to influence the economic landscape. To show this, the paper stylizes two alternative schemes of expenditure, one is labeled $American# and the other one $European#. In both schemes government purchase goods and services in order to produce a generic public good. In the "American" scheme, the states and the Federal Government purchase their goods and services efficiently regardless of the geographical location of producers. In contrast, in the "European" scheme countries partition arbitrarily their expenditure between foreign and domestic goods. The paper shows that, under the $American# scheme, trade costs play a crucial role in shaping the economic landscape. When trade costs are high, countries (or regions) are not specialized; when trade costs are low sharp specialization occurs (as predicted in Krugman and Venables 1996) . As trade costs have fallen during the decades, we would then expect the specialization which has occurred in the U.S. to happen in Europe as well. Under the "European" scheme the model behaves remarkably different and trade costs become much less important. It is possible that countries stay incompletely specialized regardless of whether trade costs are high, low, or even zero. This results suggests that in Europe international specialization may have been prevented by the pattern of government spending rather than by high trade costs. It is important to notice that this result does not depend on any sort of international or intra-national transfers, subsidies, income redistribution, shifts in demand, differences in the taxation among countries, or differences in the provision of public goods or publicly provided private goods among countries.
It rests solely on the market size effect created by the "European" spending scheme. This fact is important because it shows that governments can shape the economic landscape without direct intervention in the market. Indeed, the very essence of the "European" scheme is not to intervene into the market; rather, it is to create a market and let it operate freely.
Precisely because the $European# scheme does not interfere with the efficient functioning of the market we have one interesting result with respect to world s welfare. Not only the $European# scheme is not necessarily welfare inferior to the $American# scheme, but, under certain conditions, it is even welfare improving.
A further implication of the $European# scheme, which is a direct consequence of lower international specialization, is that income inequality among countries is smaller under this scheme than it is under the $American# scheme.
The finding of this study suggest important implications with concern to the European economic integration. One such implication is that lowering trade barriers in Europe (through infrastructure building, or through the "1992") is very unlikely to trigger the agglomeration phenomenon experienced by the U.S. unless the spending schemes of the member states turn into the $American# type. Another implication is that the "European" spending scheme allows the member states to remove the national bias in government procurement without incurring in the risk that this will cause dramatic income inequality across the member states. Moreover, smaller income inequality under the $European# scheme reduce or, under certain condition, eliminate the need for international transfers.
This paper relates to two bodies of literature: one is the new economic geography literature, the other is the macroeconomic literature that deals with aggregate demand management in models of monopolistic competition. It relates to the first literature because it is concerned with the geographical distribution of economic activity in space (the economic landscape). It is related to the second body of literature because of the typically macroeconomic mechanism involved. To understand this relationship, consider a closed economy operating under monopolistic competition and suppose that the government shifts aggregate demand in favor of the monopolistically competitive sector. Because prices are above marginal costs, this shift in demand will increase profits and then national income, thus generating a multiplier process of the textbook Keynesian type. A general, feature of these models is that aggregate demand management can stimulate the overall level of economic activity. This feature served as the driving mechanism of many macroeconomic models within the New Keynesian tradition.
1 It is surprising that this fundamental message never captured the attention of trade economists. This 1 Different authors have used it for various purposes. Benassy (1979), and Negishi, (1979) , have used it to illustrate the nature of underemployment generated by insufficiency of aggregate demand. Other, such as Hart (1982) , and Blanchard and Kiyotaki (1987) , have focused on the effectiveness of monetary and fiscal policy. The same mechanism can even been found in the earliest business cycle theory related to the works of Kalecki (1939), and Hicks (1950) . For an interesting review see Matsuyama (1995) .
paper takes this finding and casts it in the context of a model featuring a geographical dimension.
Thus, while the aforementioned macroeconomic literature focuses on the overall level of economic activity, this paper focuses on its geographical distribution. Interestingly, this transplant into a model with geographical features generates a macroeconomic mechanism which differs in an important way from the one described above. The "European" spending scheme influences the geographical distribution of economic activity without need to operate the demand shift which is instead necessary in the macroeconomic mechanism described above.
Part one sets up the model, part two shows the effect of the spending schemes on international specialization, part three discusses the efficiency of the spending schemes, part four analyzes the welfare effect of the spending schemes, part five studies the effect on income inequalities, and part 6 addresses some implications which concern European economic integration.
THE SET UP OF THE MODEL

The basic structure
This model builds on Krugman and Venables (1996) and adds the government sector. The world (alternatively being the U.S. or Europe) is composed of two countries (or states), 1 and 2. In the world there are two factors of production: labor and machines; and three sectors: the manufacturing sector "M", the government sector "G", and the service sector or "S". Henceforth,
we use subscripts to refer to countries and sectors. It is assumed that the conditions of perfect competition apply to the services sector, which uses one unit of labor to produce one unit of output. Taking the price of output in this sector (P Si ) as the numéraire we get the standard normalization that w Si = P Si = 1. The manufacturing sector uses labor to produce a differentiated commodity under increasing returns to scale at the level of the firm. Governments produce a generic service (such as the police or mail service) under a constant return to scale technology which employs labor and the differentiated commodity produced by the manufacturing sector.
Labor is assumed to have skills which are country specific (such as knowledge of the country's laws, language, and regulations) and therefore are immobile between countries. Labor is assumed to be perfectly mobile between the service sector and the government sector and only imperfectly mobile between the manufacturing sector and the other two sectors (this is further discussed in section 2.1 below). Consequently in each country we have w Si = w Gi at any time. Labor moves slowly in and out of the manufacturing sector as the wage rate there exceeds or fall short of the wage in the service sector. In the long run we have w Mi = w Si = w Gi w i 1, with strict inequality if production of services is zero in country i, in which case w Si is not defined. The two countries have equal endowment of labor L 1 = L 2 =1 and L M i is the proportion of labor employed in the production of manufactures in country i. As it is customary in this kind of models it is assumed that trade in the item produced by the constant return to scale sector is free while trade the items produced by the increasing return to scale sector is costly. Following a consolidated tradition in the literature we also assume that trade costs take the well-known iceberg form (Samuelson, 1954) . For each unit sent, only a fraction τ (0 < τ < 1) arrives at its destination.
Government demand for inputs and procurement schemes
Governments are identical in all respects except for their expenditure schemes. Governments provide a service G by using the following nested CES-Cobb-Douglas technology (take for instance government of country 1):
where g 1j (k) is the quantity of the variety k of the manufactured good produced in country j (j=1,2) and used by government 1 as input. n i is the set of varieties produced in i and, to save notation, is also the number of varieties produced in i. L G1 is the quantity of labor employed by government 1. The difference between the two schemes is that while the "American" government simply maximizes G subject to the budget constraint, the "European" government maximize G subject to the budget constraint and to an arbitrary allocation of expenditure between the domestic and the foreign manufactures. This small difference has a strong effect on international specialization.
The "European" scheme of expenditure generates a strong demand externality that tends to stabilize the equilibrium size of the manufacturing sectors in each country. To see this, it is useful to look at the expenditure per variety. Government i's expenditure on each domestic variety is:
Expression (2) illustrates the economic logic. Suppose that for some reason the manufacturing sector starts shrinking (n i decreases). As it shrinks, expenditure per variety increases.
Consequently, the sales of each of the firms in country 1 increase. Therefore, the wage that each manufacturing firm can afford to pay and still break even increases as well. But this means that the manufacturing sector can afford to attract labor, thus countervailing the initial tendency of the sector to shrink. This demand externality is at the heart of the stabilizing force generated by the "European" scheme. Interestingly, this demand externality is of the same nature as the one that drives the agglomeration forces described below. But it works in the opposite direction.
Notice that this externality does not depend on the size of the numerator of (2). This is interesting because it means that the stabilizing force does not rest on large government expenditure. The only requirement for the stabilizing mechanism to work is that the ratio (2) increase as the size of the manufacturing sector (the denominator) decreases. Moreover, and contrary to the other forces in the model, this stabilizing force is totally independent from trade costs. While all other centripetal and centrifugal forces disappear at zero trade costs, the demand externality generated by the "European" scheme remains active.
Households demand and disposable Income
In order to keep the model analytically tractable, it is assumed that the utility function of households parallels the functional form of the production function of the governments plus a term representing utility from the public good. Specifically, for a household in i, we have:
where c ij (k) is the quantity of the a generic variety produced in J and desired for consumption in 1, the expenditure shares are γ and (1-γ), and the CES sub-utility has constant elasticity σ (1,).
Households are taxed in a lump sum fashion. Because of homothetic preferences the distribution of taxation among households does not affect aggregate demand. It is assumed that governments , where I 1 d is the disposable income of the private sector in country 1. This
is the price index associated to the C.E.S. sub-utility.
Supply and the labor market.
Economies of scale in the production of each variety of the differentiated commodity are represented by a fixed cost and constant marginal costs, both in term of a composite input Z. The input requirement per x units of output is: Z = α + βx. Each firm produces the composite input Z by means of a Cobb-Douglas combination of labor and an aggregate of all varieties of the differentiated commodity. This is:
is the same as the consumption aggregate. A distinctive feature of this set up is that the manufacturing sector uses its own output as input. This feature is at the heart of the demand and cost linkages illustrated below. µ measures the importance of the industry's output as its own intermediate inputs. The firm's total cost function is:
Equation 3 x)
Aggregate firms' demand for each domestic and foreign variety of manufactures to be used as inputs are respectively: m 11 = p 11 -σ P 1 σ-1 µ n 1 TC 1 ; and m 12 = p 12 -σ P 1
The total demand faced by firms is composed of private and public demand. Firms are assumed to play an ex-post Bertrand competition. Each firm maximizes profits knowing the private and public demand and taking other firms' prices as given. This set up of the market structure follows the seminal paper by Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) . Firms in country i thus solve the following profit maximization problem:
Max
Computing the derivatives of Ψ i with respect to the prices p ii , p ji , π ii , π ji and setting each of them to zero gives the pricing rules:
w Mi , and :p ji = π ji = (σβ/τ)(σ-1) -1 w M1 (note that p ji = π ji , and p ii = π ii ). From these pricing rules we get the c.i.f./ f.o.b price relationship: this is, p ji = (1/τ) p ii . Finally, it is assumed that there is free entry into the manufacturing sector and, therefore, profits are driven to zero. Substituting p ii , π ii , π ji and p ji into (4), and setting Ψ i = 0, we can solve for [(x ii +m ii +g ii )+ (1/τ)(x ji +m ji +g ji )] which is the total quantity supplied by each firm in country i. This total level of output, which is independent of the location of the producer, turns out to be x [(x ii +m ii )+ (1/τ)(x ji +m ji )] = (α/β)(σ-1). Notice that the spending schemes do not affect either the price policy of the firm or its scale. Henceforth, to save notation, adopt the normalizations: α=1/σ; and β=(σ-1)/σ. Finally, long run employment in the three sectors, labeled as L Ai , L Gi , and L Mi , is determined by demand. Manufacturing firms expenditure on labor is a fraction (1-µ) of TC. Since profit are zero this gives: (1-µ)n 1 p 11 x = w M1 L M1 ; and (1-µ)n 2 p 22 x = w M2 L M2 . The world's number of varieties is N = 2γ/(1-µ).
Instantaneous equilibrium
We start by recalling that, using households' and firms' demand functions and the zero profit condition, total private expenditure of residents and firms of country i on all varieties is:
All markets for goods are assumed to clear at any instant. The equilibrium conditions under the "American" scheme are the following:
while under the "European" scheme are the following: 
The left-hand side of the first equation in (7) reports the total aggregate expenditure on each of the domestic varieties in its four components: the first term is domestic residents' (firms and households) expenditure; the second term is foreign residents' expenditure, the third term is the domestic government's expenditure, and the fourth term is the foreign government's expenditure.
On the right-hand side of the first equation we have the value of total supply of each of the domestic manufactures. The second equation is the analogous of the first one but refers to any of the foreign varieties. Equations (7) determine the market clearing prices as functions of L M1 , L M2 ,and of the parameters µ,σ,τ,γ,φ. From these prices, the wages obtain through the constant mark-up relationship. The interpretation of equations (6) is analogous to equations (7).
DYNAMICS AND STABILITY
Dynamics
It is assumed that labor is perfectly mobile between the service and government sectors. Labor is instead only imperfectly mobile between the manufacturing and the other sectors. Labor moves slowly into the manufacturing sector as the manufacturing wage exceeds the wage in the service and government sectors.
3 The dynamic equations are therefore the following:
, where w S,G is the wage rate in the service and government sectors (equal to one). We recall that the market equilibrium equations implicitly define a functional relationship between manufacturing wages and manufacturing employment in the neighborhood of an equilibrium point. We use this relationship to study the dynamic stability of the system. The equilibrium point is chosen at: L M1 = L M2 , T 1 = T 2 , and φ 1 = φ 2 . At this point of differentiation w M1 = w M2 = 1. We disturb this equilibrium, 3 This set up can be justified on the grounds that the service and government sector use labor with similar skills (say white collar workers) while firms use labor with other skills (say blue collar workers). The microfoundation of this set up is not the heart of the matter. Notice that the left hand sides of system (6) or (7), are the total sales of the firms located in 1 and 2 respectively. An analytically equivalent way of modeling the dynamics is to assume that, while labor is perfectly mobile across all sectors, firms move to the country where the sales (and hence profits) are higher (see, for instance, Baldwin and Venables, 1995) .
which henceforth is referred to as the symmetric equilibrium, by dL M1 = -dL M2 and use the phase diagram technique to study its local dynamic stability. Defining ω w M1 /w M2 , and λ L M1 /L M2 , the dynamics of the system can be rewritten as:
Before going into the stability analysis is useful to have an intuitive understanding of the dynamic forces coming into play. Suppose that initially the system is at the symmetric equilibrium and that a disturbance occurs such that the manufacturing sector increases in country 1 and decreases in 2. We ask whether the forces in play reinforce or counteract this tendency. An increase in n 1 , if trade costs are not zero, reduces the price index P 1 and increases P 2 thus reducing the demand for each of the n 1 varieties and increasing it for each of the n 2 varieties (see the demand functions and the first two terms in the left-hand side of (6) or (7), notice the presence of τ σ-1 1 in the second of these terms). This reduces the potential profitability in 1 and increases it in 2, thus counteracting the initial disturbance. This mechanism, which may be called the competition effect, is a force of dispersion (or centrifugal force) and it operates only if τg1. But commodities are produced by means of commodities and this generates two other mechanisms. A reduction of P 1 (and the increase of P 2 ) reduces total costs in 1 and increases them in 2 (expression (3)), thus raising firms' profitability in 1 and reducing it in 2. This mechanism which, following Krugman and Venables (1995) , we call cost (or forward) linkage, tends to reinforce the initial disturbance. This is, therefore, an agglomeration (or centripetal) force and operates only if τg1
4 It is useful to notice that assuming the initial disturbance is dL M1 = -dL M2 implies that dw M1 = -dw M2 .
This is a consequence of the fact that the world-wide expenditure on manufactures is constant. Then follows that, in a neighborhood of the equilibrium point, dL M1 /dt = -dL M2 /dt . From these properties of the model we can rewrite the dynamics as in (8).
and µg0. Further, an increase in n 1 (a decrease in n 2 ) increases the expenditure on manufactures produced in 1 , E 1 , and decreases E 2 (expression (5)), thus raising potential profitability in 1 and reducing it in 2 (see the first two terms on the left-hand-sides of (6) or (7) and observe the presence of τ σ-1
1 in the second of these term). This mechanism which, following Krugman and Venables (1995) , we call demand or backward linkage, tends to reinforces the initial disturbance.
This agglomeration (or centripetal) force operates only if τg1 and µg0. 5 Under the "American"
spending scheme this is all that happens. The balance between the three forces depicted above determines whether the initial disturbance will feed into itself or will die out. Under the "European" scheme the demand externality described in section (1.2) will operate. Because total government expenditure on domestic (foreign) varieties is constant, an increase in n 1 (decrease in n 2 ) reduces government expenditure on each variety produced in 1 (equation (2)) and increases expenditure on each variety produced in 2, thus reducing potential profitability in 1 and increasing it in 2. This force, which we may call public expenditure effect, is a force of dispersion and counteracts the initial disturbance. Notice that the public expenditure effect operates for any This shows that the "European" scheme generates a new effect independent from the other linkages and independent from trade costs. Under the "European" scheme it is the balance between these four forces that determines whether the initial disturbance will be reinforced or countered. The succeeding sections show the relative strength of the forces at work. 5 As pointed out by Krugman (1991) and Matsuyama (1995) this mechanism is central in many economic concepts elaborated by several authors of this century in different fields and for different purposes. Concepts such as "the big push" of Rosenstein-Rodan (1943) , the "circular and cumulative causation" of Myrdal (1957) , the "dynamic economies of scale" of Kaldor (1985) , and the "positive feedbacks" of Arthur (1990) can all be found to be strictly related to the mechanism described above. The term backward linkage is found in Hirschman (1958).
Stability of the symmetric equilibrium
The two schemes are analyzed in turn.
An American tale
Under the "American" spending scheme the behavior of the model is the same as if T 1 = T 2 = 0.
Differentiating equations (6) we have:
We recall that (9) is the slope of the phase line and that the symmetric equilibrium is locally stable if (9) is negative and it is locally unstable if (9) is positive. We now summarize the main features of (9). We first notice that at zero trade costs (i.e., at τ=1) the slope is zero. The first feature is therefore that: , between which the symmetric equilibrium is unstable (i.e., dω/dλ>0). For µ and σ in the domain σ>1/(1-µ), the values of τ that destabilize the equilibrium are:
To be precise, at τ=1 we have dω/dλ = 0 for any pair (L M1 , L M2 ), not only at the symmetric equilibrium. This is so because, as explained above, all linkages disappear at τ = 1. From this fact we have result A1. 7 In the domain σ<1/(1-µ), the upper and lower critical values are different but result A2 still holds.
The domain σ<1/(1-µ) is studied in the appendix.
Equation 10
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Inequalities (10) reflect the following well-known result:
Result A2: Under the "American" spending scheme there always exists a range of trade costs within which the symmetric equilibrium is unstable.
At high trade costs (i.e., τ < τ A ) the symmetric equilibrium is stable (the competition effect is stronger than the cost and demand linkages); at low (but not zero) trade costs (i.e., τ A <τ<1) the symmetric equilibrium is unstable (the demand and cost linkages dominate the competition effect).
Inequalities (10) also show that while ---A is constantly at one, τ A depends on µ and reflects the well-known relationship between trade costs and the importance of industry's output as its own intermediate input. The larger is µ the higher trade costs must be for the symmetric equilibrium to be stable.
A European story
Differentiation of system (7) gives the following expression:
A new source of geographical dimension
So far, models of the new economic geography needed two necessary ingredients: (1) economies of scale and (2) trade costs between location. Without trade costs the geographical dimension in these models is lost (see Krugman, 1991; Krugman and Venables, 1993 and 1995, and result A1) .
It is apparent from expression (11) that this is not the case under the "European" spending scheme. Expression (11) shows that at zero trade costs (i.e., τ=1) all linkages disappear except the public expenditure effect. Specifically, at zero trade costs we have from (11) that (dω/dλ) = -(δ/σ)[1-δ(1-µ)] g 0 (in fact strictly negative). Under the "European" scheme, trade costs are not a necessary ingredient to a model of economic geography. Since the existence of the linkage created by the "European" procurement scheme is independent from the point of differentiation, we have the following result.
Result E1. Government expenditure under the "European" scheme generates its own geographical dimension. Consequently, location matters also in the absence of trade costs.
The strength of the linkage created by the "European" spending scheme The stabilizing effect of the "European" procurement scheme can be seen by noticing the following. First, inspection of expression (11) shows that, in the domain σ>1/(1-µ), dω/dλ is continuous in all of its arguments (µ, σ, τ, and δ) and its second derivative with respect to τ is negative. Second, we have that
From (12) it follows that (11) lies strictly below (10) for any δ>0. Third, expression (11) is quadratic in τ σ-1 and therefore has at most two distinct roots. These three facts insure that the roots of (11) must lie strictly within those of (10). Therefore, the following strict inequalities hold:
Where the interval τ(τ E , _ -E ) is the range of trade costs that destabilizes the symmetric equilibrium under the "European" scheme. Therefore we have that:
Result E2. The range of trade costs that destabilizes the symmetric equilibrium is smaller under
the "European" scheme than it is under the "American" scheme.
In this sense, the "European" scheme has a stabilizing effect on the equilibrium. 8 Notice that because of (12) the range of instability becomes smaller as δ increases. The following question is interesting: is there a δ large enough such that the symmetric equilibrium is always stable, regardless of the level of trade costs? The answer is a conditional yes. To show this we first notice that from (11) we have:
The right-hand side of the second inequality in (14), call it δ * (µ,σ,τ), has a maximum with respect to τ at τ = τ * (µ,σ), where the full expression for τ * (µ,σ) is given in (17) in the appendix. follows that, in that set of values, the symmetric equilibrium is stable, regardless of trade costs. This result is interesting because it suggests that the difference between the U.S. and Europe in the geographical concentration of industries may not have been the consequence of higher trade cost in Europe than in the U.S.; rather, it may have been the consequence of the adoption of the "European" spending scheme by the European countries.
It is worth pointing out two practical implications for the European Union. First, result E3 tells us that as long as the two countries hold on to the "European" procurement scheme, and δ is large enough, a reduction in trade barriers (market integration) has no destabilizing effect on the symmetric equilibrium. Second, suppose that governments build infrastructures that reduce trade costs (along the lines of the Commission's White Paper). If δ is large enough, infrastructure building will never destabilize the symmetric equilibrium.
Finally, even if δ is not large enough, i.e., δ<δ * (µ,σ,τ * (µ,σ)) (which happens for instance in the neighborhood of µ=1) result E2 tells us that the destabilizing effect is much less likely to occur under the "European" scheme than under the "American" scheme.
It is useful to have a visual understanding of these three results. Figure 1 , plots expression (10) which, as we recall, is the slope of the phase line under the "American" scheme. The slope is positive and therefore the symmetric equilibrium is unstable for values of τ between τ A and 1
(result A2). At τ=1 the slope is zero (result A1). Figure 2 plots expression (11), the "European" scheme, for a low value of δ. The range of instability is smaller in Figure 2 than it is in Figure   1 . Therefore the instability of the symmetric equilibrium is less likely to occur (result E2).
Further, at τ=1 the symmetric equilibrium is stable (result E1). Figure 3 plots the "European" scheme for a large δ. In this case the symmetric equilibrium is stable for any level of trade costs (result E3).
For policy relevance it is important to have a sense of what "large" δ means. We can use (14), or (18) in the appendix, to do a rough calculation. In the OECD countries government expenditure is about 50% of GDP (δ=1/2) and government procurement is about 20% of the budget (γ=.2) (a data source is IMF, 1996) . In this situation, and setting σ5, we have that if µ50% trade costs are totally irrelevant for the stability of the equilibrium. Not unreasonable numbers.
Finally, the behavior of the model under the "European" spending scheme exhibits an additional twist of non linearity: under the "American" spending scheme the _ -A is always one; conversely, under the "European" scheme this upper limit is less than one and decreasing in δ. This means that any δ>0 divides the admissible domain of τ into three parts instead of two. At high trade costs, the dispersion forces dominate (as in the "American" case), at intermediate levels of trade costs the agglomeration forces might take over, and at low levels of trade costs dispersion forces dominate again (unlike the "American" case).
Asymmetric equilibria
Under the "American" spending scheme it is possible that agglomeration of manufacturing activities in one region only is a stable equilibrium. This can be shown by solving the model at L M j = 0 and L M i = 1, and then by calculating the wage differentials at that point. This would show, as demonstrated Krugman and Venables (1993 and 1995) , that at low trade costs the agglomeration equilibrium is stable, while at high trade costs it is not. Under the "European" scheme agglomeration of manufacturing production in one country only cannot occur. This is easily verified by noticing that the expenditure per variety goes to infinity as the manufacturing sector shrinks (see equation (2) or the last two terms on the left-hand side of system (7)). This means that w Mi goes to infinity as the sector shrinks in i, while w Mj goes to a finite number as the manufacturing sector grows in j. But this cannot lead to an equilibrium. We therefore have the following result.
Result E4. The "European" scheme prevents complete specialization from occurring, regardless of trade costs.
Instability of the symmetric equilibrium is, however, a possibility when δ < δ * (µ,σ,τ,). But if the symmetric equilibrium is unstable, since full agglomeration cannot occur, there must be three equilibria: the symmetric one, which is unstable, surrounded by two asymmetric ones which are both stable. We therefore have the following corollary.
Corollary to result E4. Under the "European" scheme, if the symmetric equilibrium is unstable, there are two stable asymmetric equilibria in which each country is incompletely specialized.
This implies that under the "European" spending scheme, even when the symmetric equilibrium is unstable, specialization is not as dramatic as it is under the "American" scheme.
A final remark is in order. The $European# scheme should not be likened to a barrier to trade. A barrier to trade, by definition, hinders trade. The $European# scheme does not hinder trade in any way. In the model above, trade cost, precisely because it hinders trade, affects international specialization (via the competition effect, the forward and backward linkages). The $European# scheme affects international specialization without hindering trade (via the public expenditure effect).
EFFICIENCY
Under the "European" spending scheme, in general, governments do not allocate efficiently their resources between the aggregate of domestic manufactures and of foreign manufactures. This inefficiency is reflected in the fact that, in general, under the "European" scheme, governments' output is lower than it is under the "American" scheme. Under the "American" scheme,
, whereas under the "European" scheme this is:
Nevertheless, when the symmetric equilibrium is stable under the "European" scheme, countries can set the policy parameter φ i (i=1,2) at an efficient level. The efficient level of φ i , labelled as φ * , is found by maximizing G i with respect to φ i (given n 1 and n 2 ). This gives φ * = 1/(1+τ σ-1 ). Replacing φ * in G i E gives indeed
This fact is interesting because it shows that the adoption of the "European" scheme does not necessarily imply a loss of efficiency.
WELFARE
This part compares the effect of the two spending schemes on world s welfare. Since the $European# spending scheme might imply a loss of efficiency in the production of G one may expect welfare under the $American# scheme to be no less than welfare under the $European# scheme, but this is not quite right. World s welfare is measured by the sum of households indirect utility in country 1 and 2. Under the $American# scheme this is:
Recall that w i can be larger than one (only i , not in i and j ) if the production of S is zero in i.
This fact impedes us to simplify notation but bears no effect on the results in the rest of the paper.
Under the $European# scheme world s welfare is:
From result E4 it follows that, under the $European# scheme w 1 = w 2 w = 1.
Some interesting analytic results can be obtained in the range of transport costs where the symmetric equilibrium is stable or can be stabilized by the $European# scheme. These results are shown in section 4.1. In the remaining range of transport costs the non linear nature of the functions involved does not permit to obtain explicit results. This is discussed in section 4.2.
Welfare comparison: symmetric equilibrium versus complete specialization.
European countries (in their most recent history) and American states enjoy an institutional framework that promote cooperation and, in certain cases, binds states /countries domestic policy. It seems appropriate to investigate welfare comparison between the two spending schemes both in a framework of cooperation in the absence of it.
Cooperative framework.
In this context the parameters φ i and φ j are set at their efficient level φ * . Under this assumption
To compare welfare under the two spending schemes we need to distinguish among two cases according to the level of trade costs.
CASE 1: high transport costs: i.e., τ < τ
A
. In this situation the symmetric equilibrium is stable regardless of the spending scheme and the price index is the same in both countries and equal to:
CASE 2: τ A < τ < τ E , or ---E < τ 1 . In this range of transport costs, under the $American# scheme, the symmetric equilibrium is unstable, complete specialization occurs, and the price index is (w i ) -γ N 1/(1-σ) in one country and (w j ) -γ τN 1/(1-σ) in the other country (and w i 1 , w j =1).
Conversely, under the $European# scheme, the symmetric equilibrium is stable and the price index is the same in both countries and equal to [N/2(1+τ
. Replacing these price indexes in the expressions for V w E (φ,δ,τ) and V w A (τ) gives:
for any γ, µ, σ, τ, δ, with equality only at zero transport cost (τ = 1). The proof is as follows (the proof assumes σ > 1+ γ):
(1) at τ = 0 we have: V w E > V w A . At τ = 1 we have V w E V w A , with equality if w i =1.
(2) the signs of the following derivatives hold for any µ, δ, τ (0,1) and for any σ > 1+ γ : dV w E /dτ > 0, and d 2 V w E /dτ 2 > 0 ; dV w A /dτ > 0 and d 2 V w A /dτ 2 < 0; (3) At τ = 1 we have that (dV w E /dτ ) = (dV w A /dτ) , which means that V w E and V w A have the same slope, they are tangent to each other if w i =1.
In words this means that: since V w E is convex and V w A is concave and both are increasing in τ, and since they have the same slope τ = 1, where V w E V w A , it must be that V w E V w A for any τ. This finding can be summarized in the following result:
Result W1. In the range of transport costs where the $European# scheme assures the stability of the symmetric equilibrium, the $European# scheme under cooperation is welfare improving with respect to the $American# scheme.
This is quite an interesting and, at first sight, surprising result. It says that, under certain conditions, government intervention results in a pattern of international specialization which is welfare improving with respect to the one that would emerge as a result of market forces alone.
This result is the consequence of the fact that, as stated above, the essence of the $European# scheme is not to intervene into the market (for instance through distorting incentives); rather, it is to create a market and let it operate freely.
The result is interesting also under another respect. In the model used in this paper (which builds on Krugman and Venables, 1996) complete specialization yields lower world s welfare than incomplete specialization (except at τ = 1). The $European# spending scheme under cooperation permits to rip the benefits from incomplete specialization without loss of efficiency.
Non cooperative framework.
A plausible set up is one of a simple non cooperative game in which each government chooses the parameters φ i with the objective to maximize the indirect utility of its own citizens taking φ j as given. One result is immediate: since the functional form of V i E is the same for both countries it follows that any Nash equilibrium of this simple game, call it {φ 1 , φ 2 }, is such that φ 1 = φ 2 φ , whatever this value might be. Incidentally, this fact justifies having assumed throughout the paper that φ 1 = φ 2 . Unfortunately, it is not possible to compute explicitly the value φ 1 = φ 2
9
. Yet, we can compute the welfare minimizing value of φ, i.e., the one that minimizes G i E (for any given n i and n j ), this is: φ = 1. 10 We do not know whether the strategy profile {φ 1 = 1, φ 2 = 1} is a Nash equilibrium or not. We only know that, if it is a Nash equilibrium, is the worst possible one from the point of view of world s welfare. We use this worst possible outcome to compare welfare between the two schemes. The lowest possible world welfare under the $European# scheme then
CASE 1: high transport costs: i.e., τ < τ A . The symmetric equilibrium is stable regardless of the spending scheme and P 1 = P 2 . Because of the inefficiency in production of G we have that V w E (1,δ,τ) < V w A (τ). This is the only case in which the $American# scheme is unambiguously welfare superior.
CASE 2: τ A < τ < τ E , or ---E < τ 1 . The $European# scheme causes a loss of efficiency in the production of G but stabilizes the symmetric equilibrium. It is possible that welfare is higher under the $European# scheme than under the $American# scheme. This is so because the welfare gain resulting from incomplete specialization may over-weigh the efficiency loss. Measuring welfare shows that V w E (1,δ,τ) > V w A (τ) if:
. Since the RHS of the inequality ranges in [0, ) while δ ranges in [0, 1] , it follows that, even in the worst possible Nash equilibrium, the $European# scheme may be welfare superior to the $American# scheme.
Welfare comparison: asymmetric equilibria versus complete specialization.
We are in the range of transport costs where, under the $European#, scheme the symmetric equilibrium is unstable, i.e., τ E < τ < ---E (this set, according to result E3, might be empty). From result E4 and its corollary we know that, under the $European# scheme there are two asymmetric equilibria. Let s call the equilibrium values of n i and n j in the asymmetric equilibria ñ i and ñ j .
We know that ñ i > ñ j for i = 1,2 but the exact values cannot be found explicitly. Yet, we know that (P 1 -γ + P 2 -γ ) A < (P 1 -γ + P 2 -γ ) E by the fact that (P 1 -γ + P 2 -γ ) is a symmetric concave parabola with respect to n i and has its maximum at n 1 = n 2 = N/2 (the superscript $A# and $E# attached to the price indexes means that the price indexes take the value that obtains under the corresponding scheme). It is useful to define c(τ) (P 1
)]δ ; this difference is positive or negative depending on the values of the parameters and on the specific value of ñ i and ñ j . This tells us that even in the case of asymmetric equilibria and under the worst possible outcome (φ = 1) it is still possible that the $European# scheme is welfare improving with respect to the $American# scheme.
Summary
Welfare analysis can be summarized as follows. There are two unambiguous results: (1) when transport cost is high, the $European# scheme is at most as good as the $American# scheme; (2) the $European# scheme is unambiguously better than the $American# scheme if the former is efficient (φ 1 = φ 2 = φ * ) and if it guarantees the stability of the symmetric equilibrium ( τ A < τ < τ E , or ---E < τ 1 ), this is result W1. In all other cases, the welfare effect depends on the specific values of parameters. Yet, in spite of the efficiency loss in the production of G, the $European# system is not necessarily welfare reducing with respect to the $American# scheme.
INCOME INEQUALITY
The two spending schemes differ under another respect. Income inequalities between the two countries under the $European# spending scheme are never larger than under the $American# scheme. To see this it is enough to look at the price indexes for the difference in the real wage depends on the difference between the price indexes. This is:
which has its two largest absolute values at ñ i = N (i=1,2). As usual, we recall that w i = w j =1 in incomplete specialization and that w i or w j , not both, may exceed 1 if complete specialization occurs. From inspection of (16) we see that incomplete specialization, i.e. ñ i g N (i=1,2), results in smaller income inequality for any τ < 1. The $European# scheme prevents complete specialization from occurring. Therefore we have the following result.
Result I1. Real wage inequalities under the $European# scheme are smaller or equal than under the $American# scheme.
They are equal only for high trade cost, where the symmetric equilibrium is stable independently of the spending scheme, or at zero trade costs.
ECONOMIC INTEGRATION AND CHOICE OF THE SPENDING SCHEME
We can use the findings of part 4 and 5 to discuss the choice of the spending scheme. We limit the attention the situation in which countries agree on a common objective function (this could be the case of the US for instance, where the Constitution unites the States under common goals; it is also the case of recent European history where countries sets common goals on an increasing number of issues). A plausible objective function is one were the countries care about their total welfare and about income inequalities. A classic specification would be: Ω = ηV w + (1-η)(P i There is one interesting practical implication: Whenever the $European# scheme is welfare improving with respect to the $American# scheme, the former can be used as a substitute of international transfers in order to reduce income inequality. A stronger result obtains in the range of trade costs τ A < τ < τ E , or ---E < τ 1. The specification of the objective function above and the findings of this paper are quite general but also reflect closely one important real situation which is worth being illustrated. The E.U. is of the spending scheme, but might trigger sharp international specialization and, consequently, sharp income inequality. Transfer programs remedy to income inequality but do not prevent them from occurring. In this impasse the choice of the spending scheme seems to play crucial role.
Eliminating the national bias in government procurement can be done in two ways. One is to bind the E.U. countries to adopting the "American" scheme. This option not necessarily increases V w and certainly does not help to prevent income inequalities. The national bias can alternatively be removed by allowing the member states to adopt (or, rather, to keep in place) the "European" scheme and binding them to set parameters at the efficient level, i.e., φ 1 = φ 2 = φ * . This second option not only might lead to higher V w than under the $American# scheme but also will certainly contrast the emergence of income inequality and thus will reduce the need for transfer programs.
CONCLUSION
This work discusses the effect of government procurement on the pattern of specialization, on welfare, and on income inequality. It also derives some important policy implications concerning economic integration in Europe.
This study demonstrates that the "European" scheme has a strong power in preventing sharp specialization in production. This is the consequence of the fact that the $European# scheme reduces the range of trade costs for which the symmetric equilibrium is unstable (result E2). The stabilizing power of the "European" scheme increases with the size of government expenditure.
If it expenditure is large enough, the symmetric equilibrium is stable regardless of trade costs (result E3). Moreover under the "European" scheme, even if the symmetric equilibrium is unstable countries always remain incompletely specialized (result E4). Further, under the"European" spending scheme, contrary to models of economic geography so far, trade costs are not necessary in order to generate a geographical dimension in the model (result E1). In the light of these results one may speculate that the difference between U.S. and Europe in the geographical concentration of industries may be due to the adoption of the "American" spending scheme in the U.S. and of the "European" scheme in Europe. This possible explanation is not in contrast with the one that emphasize the role of transport costs. The paper has discussed the mutual interaction between trade costs and public procurement in influencing the patter of specialization.
Important policy implications flow from this study with regard to economic integration in Europe. On the basis of the above results, and to the extent that the spending scheme of the European countries remain of the "European" type, market integration in Europe is far less likely to trigger the specialization phenomenon than predicted by the Krugman-Venables model. By the same token, large programs of infrastructure building aimed to reduce trade costs, such as those envisaged in the Commission's white paper, will be unlikely to unleash the agglomeration forces.
Two surprising result emerge from welfare analysis. The $European# scheme does not necessarily imply an efficiency loss in the production of the public good. Even when this inefficiency occurs, the gains from incomplete specialization may over-weigh the inefficiency in the production of the public good. Moreover, under certain condition, the $European# scheme is unambiguously welfare superior to the $American# scheme (result W1).
A further interesting property of the $European# scheme is that it reduces income inequality (result I1). A consequence is that the $European# scheme could in principle be used to eliminate the national bias in government procurement without causing the risk of large income inequalities. In this respect, under certain conditions, the $European# scheme is a more efficient policy instrument than international transfers (result T1). This is so because the latter do not prevent income inequalities to occur while the former in addition to can reduce income inequality and increase world s welfare at the same time. Equation 18 ( ) (5), (2), and the demand functions we can rewrite equations (7) Differentiating any of the equations in (19) and recalling that n 1 + n 2 = N= 2γ/(1-µ) gives: dn i /dφ i > 0 ; dn i /dφ j < 0 ; and dn i /dφ i = -dn i /dφ j . Further dn i /dφ i = dn j /dφ j = 0 if dφ i = dφ j .
